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The approach of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe has inspired a large
number of studies seeking to uncover possible differences in the impact of monetary
policy changes on output and inflation among European countries. Important
differences in the impact of the single monetary policy would be a potential source of
cyclical divergence and could impose significant adjustment demands on other
economic policies.
Hitherto, academic studies concerned with the pooling of monetary sovereignty in
EMU have tended to focus more on the likely incidence of asymmetric shocks and
adjustment mechanisms to such shocks. In comparison, differences in the
transmission of the common monetary policy seemed a relatively minor issue. It is
only recently, and to some extent in the aftermath of the comprehensive study on
financial structures and the monetary transmission mechanism in BIS (1995),  that the
potential significance of differences in monetary transmission has become a popular
topic of analysis, cf. e.g. Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996), Britton and Whitley
(1997), Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), and Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998).
Heuristically, the case for asymmetries in monetary policy transmission is easy to
make. Such asymmetries are usually seen to stem from cross-country differences in
financial structures, for example in terms of the development of credit markets and the
shares of fixed and variable-rate borrowing in mortgage, company and government
financing.  The claim one encounters most frequently is that a given change in short-
term interest rates may have larger effects in an economy like the UK’s with a heavily
indebted household sector and variable mortgage rates than in some continental
European economies where fixed-rate financing is widespread and the response of
bank lending rates tend to be sluggish.  Another widespread assertion is that monetary
policy would have a relatively smaller impact on spending and output in Italy, where
the household sector holds large variable-rate claims on the government, since
changes in interest rates might be accompanied by an off-setting fiscal impact on
disposable income.
However, knowledge of the differences in financial structure does not translate easily
into robust conclusions about the likely impact of monetary policy.  This is partly
because, at the theoretical level, there is typically no clear-cut relationship between
such features and the power of monetary policy.  For instance, sluggish adjustment of
bank lending rates may help shield companies from interest rate movements, but
banks may apply non-price rationing of loans, thus amplifying the effects of monetary
policy through the so-called “credit channel”
1.  The distinction between fixed rate or
variable-rate financing may not matter for the substitution between current and future
consumption except in the presence of liquidity constraints, and the effects of interest
rate changes will depend on the financial positions as well as the marginal
propensities to spend for both borrowers and lenders.  At an empirical level, the
                                                
1 On the credit channel of monetary policy, see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995).  For an empirical
perspective, see Davis (1995)4
different particularities of a given country in terms of financial structure may have
off-setting effects on the power of the monetary transmission.
The analysis of the potential role of differences in monetary policy transmission in
EMU is further complicated by the fact that transmission mechanisms are likely to
change in the new regime as countries become subject to a common policy and
regulatory environment. In this paper, we will concentrate on the issue of correctly
identifying monetary policy actions and their causal effect on the economy in the
current (or more precisely, historical) set-up, although we believe that the question of
gauging the extent to which these differences will disappear with EMU is of at least
equal importance.
We start in the following section by reviewing the existing empirical evidence on
differences in monetary transmission between Member States.  In our view, the
econometric evidence does not provide a coherent picture of such differences, much
less of a ranking of how monetary policy has impacted historically in the four major
EU economies.  We then go on to focus on a particular aspect which may underlie the
differences in results but which typically receives little attention in this part of the
literature, namely the problem in identifying the causal effect of monetary policy.
Movements of the economy following a change in the stance of monetary policy may
be due to the policy action itself or they may be related to the underlying causes that
spurred that action.  In practical terms, the question is when to interpret a co-
movement of a monetary policy variable and another variable as causality, and when
to interpret it as a response of two endogenous variables to common causes.  In
examining the scope of the identification problem, we use the structural VAR
framework, which allows a very general approach while remaining computationally
manageable.  Our results show that the way structural identification of monetary
policy is handled can have very substantial effects on the results. According to our
estimations, once the uncertainty involved in the structural identification is accounted
for, no statistically significant differences in monetary transmission can be found for a
group of three large EU countries (Germany, France and the United Kingdom).
 (YLGHQFHRQWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHPRQHWDU\WUDQVPLVVLRQ
The existing empirical evidence on differences in the impact of monetary policy on
output and prices in European countries has been reviewed in Britton and Whitley
(1997) and in Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998).  The summary provided here
focuses on the four major EU economies.  We review the main results in the
perspective of a brief recap of the principal methodological differences and potential
shortcomings of various methods.
Since the evidence refers to the strength of the monetary transmission in the past, i.e.
before the inception of EMU, the results are influenced by the differing monetary and
exchange rate regimes under which countries have hitherto operated.  Whether and to
what extent any past differences in monetary transmission will remain in EMU is
another matter.  We focus here on the historical evidence.5
In the spirit of Britton and Whitley (1997), we divide the empirical studies into the
following categories:
(i) large-scale macroeconometric single-country models (MEM1s);
(ii) large-scale multi-country models (MEM2s);
(iii) small-scale structural models (SSMs);
(iv) single equation models (SEMs); and
(v) structural VAR models (SVARs).
The results are reported in Table 1.  In the interest of brevity, we focus wherever
possible on the estimated impact on output of a given monetary policy action at a
particular horizon, namely in the year “t+1” following the policy action (quarters 5-8
after the initiation of the action)
2.  This horizon is chosen because in almost all the
studies surveyed, the maximum impact of the monetary policy action on output falls
within that year in most countries.  For the study by Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi
(1998), the impact over this horizon is not available to us.  In this case, the impacts
after 8-12 months and after 24 months are reported. Focusing on a single
representative number for the output effect allows us to make a simple ranking of the
power of monetary policy in each of the four major EU economies according to each
study. Ignoring the dynamics of the output responses tends, if anything, to
underestimate the variation in results for a given country between different studies (to
the extent they are comparable).  In general, the rankings obtained in this way
correspond well with a casual assessment of the full dynamic impact.
In interpreting the results reported in the table, it is important to keep in mind that
they are often not comparable across studies, and sometimes not strictly comparable
across countries within a given study.  This holds in particular for two reasons:
L'LIIHUHQWH[FKDQJHUDWHDVVXPSWLRQVIRUPRGHOVLPXODWLRQV: For the simulations of
macroeconometric models and the small structural models, the exchange rate
assumptions are crucial.  For instance, in the study reported in the first line of Table 1
(BIS (1995)), the simulations for France, Germany and Italy are all carried out under
the assumption of fixed exchange rates within the ERM
3, whereas the simulation for
the UK assumes a flexible exchange rate.  Also the impulse response functions in the
structural VARs implicitly assume different exchange rate responses across countries.
                                                
2 In some cases where the data were not available to us, the impact has been gauged from the graphical
representations in the original sources.  We do not consider the impact on prices, not because it is not
important, but because we wish to keep the discussion as short as possible and because most of the
studies reviewed focus on output.  Several of them do not report the price impact.  For those that do,
the results seem to corroborate our general conclusion concerning the output effects, namely that there
is no consistent pattern across studies, neither of the size nor of the ranking of the impact in various
countries.
3 They do not take into account that this would require a simultaneous increase in interest rates in the
ERM area and thus have repercussions on each country via reduced foreign demand.6
LL 'LIIHUHQW PRQHWDU\ VKRFNV: Different studies report the response to different
monetary shocks.  These have been standardised to the extent possible.  The table
contains four basic types of monetary shock.  The first is an increase in the short-term
interest rate sustained for two years (used in the MEM1 results, some MEM2 results
and the SSM results).  The second is a sustained 1% decrease in the money target
(used in several MEM2 results)
4.  The third is a simultaneous 1% permanent shock to
interest rates in all EU countries keeping intra-EU exchange rates fixed (used in SEM
results).  The fourth and last type is a one standard deviation shock to the interest rate
equation in VAR models; in these cases both the initial size of the shock and the
subsequent movement in interest rates may vary between countries.  The importance
of these differences is illustrated in the last two lines of Table 1 which show the
results of a particular VAR (Gerlach and Smets (1995)) using both one standard
deviation shocks, and a standardised shock amounting to a temporary one percent
increase in interest rates sustained for two years.
It follows from the above considerations that none of the studies reported, with the
exception of Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998), attempts to estimate the impact
of the type of common monetary shock which will occur in EMU, namely a
simultaneous and equal change in policy interest rates with fixed exchange rates
among participating countries, a simultaneous and equal move in the common euro
exchange rate against third countries, and a similar response along the yield curve.
The data provided in Table 1 should therefore not uncritically be interpreted from the
perspective of assessing possible differences in the EMU regime.
Moreover, in the majority of the studies under examination, differences in monetary
transmission are not established with statistical rigour.  We follow the practice of
loose language here.  Hence, when stating that an impact in one country is “stronger”
or “weaker” than in another we merely mean that the two point estimates differ, with
no implication of the possible statistical significance of the difference.  In some cases,
as in the comparison of macroeconomic models, the context does not allow any kind
of rigorous statistical testing.  However, even in the cases in which the approach
would have allowed statistical evaluation of the differences, the possibility has often
not been exploited.
Inevitably, all of the approaches face a number of methodological problems, some of
which are specific to the approach, and some of which are common (even if they
manifest themselves differently in the approaches considered). A crucial issue of the
latter variety is the correct identification of the causal effect of monetary policy on the
economy.  The problems involved are of the ordinary textbook variety, mundane in
almost all econometrics. Essentially, when trying to pinpoint the effects of monetary
policy on, say, output and price level, one must recognise not only that monetary
policy is an endogenous variable which responds to the same set of underlying causes
                                                
4 In some cases, the original sources show the impact of a 10% increase in the money target (IMF
Multimod) or a 3% increase in the money target phased in over 1 year (Taylor (1993)).  These shocks
have been standardised to a 1% contraction in the money target assuming linearity.7
as output and prices, but also that there is a direct reverse causality from the two
variables to monetary policy. The difficulty is to decide when to interpret correlation
as causality (or, equivalently, the lack of correlation as the lack of causality)
5.
Econometrically, the question is about omitted variables and simultaneity.
In large-scale models, simultaneity among a wide range of macroeconomic variables
is almost routinely ignored when, as is typically the case, equations are estimated one-
by-one.  Small-scale structural models may be estimated jointly but, as with large-
scale models, the exclusion restrictions imposed to achieve identification are typically
not well accounted for
6.  The latter generally also applies to single-equation models.
Structural VARs have the advantage that they force the researcher to deal explicitly
with the identification problem but, as with the other approaches, there is a high
degree of arbitrariness involved in choosing a basis for identification.  The problem of
omitted variables looms large in all approaches, including the large structural models
since they are too large to be estimated as a system and individual equations are
typically estimated separately.
/DUJHVFDOHPDFURHFRQRPHWULFVLQJOHFRXQWU\PRGHOV0(0V
The most commonly quoted evidence based on national econometric models is a set
of independent simulations carried out by the G10 national central banks as part of the
BIS study of financial structures and the monetary transmission mechanisms; these
results are reported in Smets (1995).  According to these results, monetary policy has
essentially identical effects on output at the one-year horizon in Germany, France and
Italy (in the simulations assuming fixed intra-ERM exchange rates)
7.  Among the four
large economies, only the UK stands out.  According to the simulations, the effect of
                                                
5 This problem was already known to Kareken and Solow (1963): “Imagine an economy buffeted by all
kinds of cyclical forces, ... Suppose by heroic...variation in the money supply...the Federal Reserve
manages deftly to counter all disturbing impulses and to stabilize the level of economic activity
absolutely.  Then, an observer...would see peaks and troughs in  monetary change accompanied by a
steady level of aggregate activity.  He would presumably conclude that monetary policy has no effects
at all, which would be precisely the opposite of the truth.”.
6 As an example, a structural model may contain a money demand equation relating M to Y, P and i (in
standard notation), and a money supply reaction function which may depend e.g. on Y and P.  In this
case, identification has been achieved by excluding the interest rate from the money supply equation.
But is it reasonable to assume that a central bank which targets the money supply does not look at the
interest rate at all?  Or, if central bank conducts monetary policy by setting a short-term interest rate, is
it reasonable to assume that it does not take into account developments in the money supply at all?  If
the answer to these questions is “no” then Y, P and i all belong in ERWK the money supply and the
money demand equations.  Therefore, it is not clear whether regression estimates will deliver one or the
other, or a mixture of the two.
7 In table 1, the reported impact of national monetary policy in the Netherlands is considerably smaller.
This is a consequence of the relative openness of that economy.  In the scenario of a common increase
in interest rates in the ERM (or EMU) countries, demand would fall also among the Netherlands’
trading partners, and the overall effect would be closer to that reported for France, Germany and Italy.8
monetary policy on output is about twice as large in that country as in Germany,
France and Italy.  This is partly due to the fact that the UK model, as stated above, is
simulated under a different assumption about exchange rates.
While national macroeconometric models may reflect a detailed knowledge of the
respective economies, a potential problem with this approach is that the specification
of individual country models may, in practice, vary depending on the priors, views
and assumptions of their respective model-builders.  This pertains to a wide range of
areas, e.g. different methodologies on whether and how to incorporate long-run
constraints on the economy or whether to model expectations as adaptive or forward-
looking and model-consistent (cf. Smets (1995)).  Clearly, assumptions in these areas
are highly relevant for an assessment of the effects of monetary policy.  Such
differences in model specification are likely to obscure, and could well dominate, any
genuine differences in real economic structures and behaviour.
/DUJHVFDOHPDFURHFRQRPHWULFPXOWLFRXQWU\PRGHOV0(0V
Other macroeconometric models tend to produce results which are often qualitatively
different from those obtained using the national central bank models.  Table 1
summarises results from the US Federal Reserve’s MCM model (reported in BIS
(1995)), the IMF’s Multimod standard simulations (Masson HWDO (1990)), the
Commission services’ Quest II model (Roeger and In’t Veld (1997)), and the model
results reported in Taylor (1993).  For the first model, results are reported for the
same shock as in the national central bank models but with fully endogeneous
exchange rates.  The output responses are similar between Germany and France, but
considerably smaller in Italy.  As before, they are clearly stronger in the UK.  The
deviating results for Italy and the UK can to a large extent be accounted for by
differences in the net interest-bearing asset position of the household sector.
For the other three multi-country models, results are reported for a shock of a 1%
decrease in the money target with endogeneous exchange rates.  In all of the three
models, there are no significant differences in the output response between different
countries. The only exception is the Taylor model for the UK where the output
response is, in contrast with the previous findings, considerably smaller than in
Germany, France and Italy.  This is mainly due to a much smaller estimated response
of domestic investment and consumption in the UK in that model.
Multi-country models tend to impose a similar structure across countries.  While this
may limit the potential biases underlying the use of national models, it could mean
that multi-country models are less able to capture specific features of individual
economies.  In part, this may account for the tendency for such models to give
broadly similar results for different countries.7DEOH (PSLULFDODVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHLPSDFWRIPRQHWDU\SROLF\RQRXWSXWLQYDULRXV(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV
,PSDFWRQUHDO*'3LQ\HDUWWRTXDUWHUVDIWHURULJLQDOVKRFNSHUFHQWDJHGHYLDWLRQIURPEDVHOLQH
6WXG\ 6KRFN ' ) , 8. ( 1/ 5DQNLQJ
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&RPPHQWV
6LQJOHFRXQWU\PDFURPRGHOV
National Central Bank models (BIS (1995)) Type 1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 0.0 -0.2 D = F = I
(< UK)
Fixed ERM rates for D, F and I;
endogenous exchange rate for UK
0XOWLFRXQWU\PDFURPRGHOV
Fed MCM model (BIS (1995)) Type 1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -1.2 - - I < D = F < UK Endogenous exchange rates
IMF Multimod standard multiplier Type 2 -0.5 - - -0.5 - - D = UK Endogenous exchange rates
Quest II (Commission Services) Type 2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 I <
 D = F = UK Endogenous exchange rates
Taylor (1993) Type 2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 - - UK < I = D = F Endogenous exchange rates
6PDOOVWUXFWXUDOPRGHOV
Britton and Whitley (1997) Type 1 -0.5 -0.5 - -0.3 - - UK < D = F Each country estimated separately
Britton and Whitley (1997) Type 1 -0.4 -0.4 - -0.4 - - D =
 F = UK All countries estimated jointly
5HGXFHGIRUPHTXDWLRQ
Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) Type 3 -0.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 - UK = D = F < I Effect after 8-12 months
Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) Type 3 -1.4 -1.5 -2.1 -0.9 -1.5 - UK < D = F < I Effect after 2 years
6WUXFWXUDO9$5V
Ramaswamy and Sløk (1997) Type 4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 F < I = UK < D Baseline model
Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996) Type 4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 I < F = UK < D Baseline model (model 1)
Gerlach and Smets (1995) Type 4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 - - F = I < D < UK 1 standard deviation shock
Gerlach and Smets (1995) Type 1 -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 - - F = I < UK< D 1%  interest rate hike for 2 years
7\SHVRIPRQHWDU\VKRFNType 1: 1% point rise in short-term interest rates sustained for at least two years;  Type 2: 1% permanent decrease in money target;
Type 3: 1% simultaneous permanent increase in short-term interest rates; Type 4: 1 standard deviation interest rate shock10
6PDOOVWUXFWXUDOPRGHOV660V
The small structural model estimated by Britton and Whitley (1997) is a variant of the
Mundell-Fleming model incorporating the Dornbusch overshooting mechanism.  The
parameter estimates suggest that the sensitivity of output to the real interest rate may
be lower in the United Kingdom than in Germany or France.  However, the
differences are generally not large enough to be statistically significant.  When the
models are estimated separately, the simulated output effects are noticeably smaller in
the UK than in the other two countries, but when the three country models are
estimated jointly, the output response in the UK is virtually identical to Germany and
France.
One specific criticism against this type of model is that it may be too parsimonious
and too highly aggregated to capture cross-country differences in economic structure.
6LQJOHHTXDWLRQPRGHOV6(0V
Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) estimate a single equation for output growth
(industrial production) in each of six countries based on (1) past output growth, (2)
past output growth in the other countries, (3) present and past values of “expected”
and “unexpected” interest rates
8, and (4) present and past values of each country’s
bilateral exchange rate against the DM and the US dollar.  The estimation method
allows for simultaneity in the determination of output across countries, but not for
simultaneity in the determination of output, prices and monetary policy in each
country.
An advantage of this specification is that it allows one to control for the intra-
European exchange rate channel, and thus to simulate the impact of a common
interest rate change with fixed exchange rates among the European countries.  The
results are clearly different from the previously reported findings
9.  The impact on
output, as reported in table 1, is similar in Germany, France and Spain but much
stronger in Italy (and Sweden, not reported in table 1).  At the other end of the
spectrum, the UK stands out with a significantly smaller long-term impact.
The estimation of single equation models of this sort suffers from the same
methodological problems of identification as the other approaches
10.  Moreover, it is
                                                
8 The authors decompose interest rate changes into “expected” and “unexpected” components  using
fitted values and residuals of an estimated monetary policy reaction function for each of the six
countries (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain and Sweden).  For countries other than
Germany, the authors find large residuals during periods of exchange rate turbulence that may be
associated with shocks to risk premia.  In the preferred specification of the output growth equations,
only expected interest rate changes are included (the unexpected ones are statistically insignificant).
9 The long-run output response which is obtained after two years is clearly stronger than in the other
models reported.  This is partly due to the simultaneous interest rate shock which allows for spill-overs
between countries.
10 The analysis is akin to the so-called “St. Louis Fed” approach due to Anderson and Jordan (1968).
See Cochrane (1994b) for a critique of this approach.11
by no means clear what economic theory would lead to such an equation being a good
approximation to the true reduced form equation for real output growth.
6WUXFWXUDO9$5V
Table 1 reports the results of three recent studies which have applied the VAR
methodology to assess the possible differences in monetary transmission mechanisms
in Europe.  The way in which we report the results, at the one-year horizon and for
output only, does not capture fully the richness of these results.  However, it does
appear that while each individual study may have identified differences in the shape
and timing of the responses between countries, the pattern is not consistent across
studies.  In our view, the simplification adopted here by disregarding the time profile
of output responses does not seriously underestimate the indications of differences in
the monetary transmission mechanism.
In interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that in some of these studies the
type of monetary action considered -- namely, a one standard deviation shock to the
interest rate equation --  may deviate substantially between countries.
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) report that the full effects on output in one group of
EU countries (including Germany and the UK) take longer to occur, but are almost
twice as large as in another group (including France and Italy).  The results in Barran,
Coudert and Mojon (1996) indicate, for their basic model including five variables, a
similar output response in France and the United Kingdom, a somewhat stronger
impact in Germany, and a somewhat smaller impact in Italy.  Gerlach and Smets
(1995), using long-run identifying restrictions, report similar output reponses across
countries
11, except in the case of the United Kingdom, where the effects are somewhat
larger
12.  When the monetary policy shocks are standardised by assuming that the
central bank raises the nominal interest rate by 100 basis points for eight quarters,
after which the interest rate returns to baseline, the results are somewhat different.
Now, monetary policy is most powerful in Germany with an impact about twice as
large as in France and Italy and with the UK in between.
Although the VAR models have the advantage of dealing explicitly with the
identification of monetary policy
13, they suffer from a number of disadvantages.
First, their “black-box” nature makes it difficult to relate estimated parameters and
impulse responses to structural differences in the economies.  For instance, if
monetary policy is found to be more powerful in one country than in another, the
                                                
11 This is confirmed for Germany, France and Italy in Smets (1997).
12 The latter is in contrast with Smets (1996) where the output effect is smaller in the UK.
13 Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997) assumes that there is no contemporaneous (within quarter) effect of
monetary policy on output and prices (this type of identification scheme in a three-variable VAR often
leads to the so-called “price puzzle”,  which suggests that the scheme may not identify monetary policy
shocks correctly, cf. e.g. Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996)); Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996) also
assume a recursive Cholesky decomposition (using five variables, including the world export price
index, the “price puzzle” is largely gone, but the assumption that the exchange rate does not respond
contemporaneously to the interest rate seems implausible); and Gerlach and Smets (1995) use long-run
identifying restrictions (which, as Faust and Leeper (1997) have shown, can be misleading).12
model does not indicate what economic structures cause this result.  Second, since the
VAR approach focuses on the instances when monetary policy-makers deviated from
their “normal” reaction function, it says relatively little about the economic
consequences of the way in which the central bank normally conducts monetary
policy
14.
6XPPLQJXSWKHHYLGHQFH
The results reviewed here are obtained under different assumptions and with different
methods; they are often not comparable between studies, and sometimes not even
within studies.  However, the general conclusion emerges that very different results
can be obtained for the same country using different models.  These differences are
often larger than the differences which appear across countries using a given model or
method.  Moreover, different studies tend to provide a different ranking of the four
major EU economies with respect to the power of monetary transmission.  Although it
may be perfectly reasonable to have more faith in the results of one study or method
over the others, the variation in the results indicates that econometric analysis has not
provided consistent evidence about either the extent nor the ranking of possible
differences in monetary transmission across EU countries.
                                                
14 Although the VAR approach focuses on monetary “shocks” or “innovations”, it does not rule out the
possibility that systematic and predictable monetary policy affect the course of the economy in an
important way (Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)).13
 7KH LQGHWHUPLQDF\ RI PRQHWDU\ VKRFNV ¾ VWUXFWXUDO
LGHQWLILFDWLRQRI9$5V
In what follows, we will analyse the identification of a causal structure between
monetary policy and the economy in the framework of the vector autoregressive
model. It is worth emphasising that the problems discussed are in no way specific to
the particular modelling approach ¾ it is just as easy to misrepresent co-movement as
causality using any of the approaches outlined above. The reason for concentrating on
the VAR framework is that it forces one to tackle the identification problem in a
particularly explicit form. At the same time, it offers a straightforward tool for
examining the extent of the problem with a minimal set of prior restrictions. And, as a
final bonus, it is perhaps the approach most widely used in cross-country
comparisons, and therefore a good candidate for presenting the methodological point.
The generic VAR model can be written as
(1) . ) ’ ( , )] ( [ S = = - W W W W X X ( X ; / $ ,
Here  W ;   is the vector of endogenous variables,  W X  is the residual vector, and
N
N/ $ / $ / $ + + = ... ) ( 1  is a lag polynomial. Given that  W ;  is a stationary process, it
has a Granger representation
(2) . ) ( W W X / % ; =
where 
1 )] ( [ ) (
- - = / $ , / % . In general, the error term X has a non-diagonal covariance
matrix, indicating that the data contains some regularities left unexplained by the
model. Whether this is the case or not, the model (2) does not yet provide a basis for
an analysis of causal relations. Instead, it is to be seen as the reduced form of the
underlying VWUXFWXUDO model
(3) S = = = ’ , ) ’ ( , ) ( ** , HH ( *H / % ; W W .
Here  W W X * H
1 - =  are the normalised VWUXFWXUDO shocks. The structural shocks are
supposed to be economically meaningful, genuine primary shocks, exogenous to
everything else in the model, including each other ¾ hence the diagonality of their
covariance matrix. This exogeneity property allows one to analyse their effects on the
model variables without having to bother with simultaneity considerations.
The problem is that the identification of the correct * is far from straightforward. The
requirement  S = ’ **  falls well short of identifying a unique structural form. For any
candidate * there exists an infinity of other possible structural identification schemes
=*, where = is any orthonormal matrix, i.e.  , == = ’ . Each = defines a different
structural identification scheme, which fits the data equally well as the original
scheme. Since the data cannot differentiate between the different identification
schemes, this has to be done by the econometrician.
 15
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This problem is well understood in the econometric profession. Generally, the
solution has been to impose a sufficient number of additional restrictions on * (or on
a function of *) to identify a unique *. Traditionally, the usual (indeed, almost
mechanical) procedure was to assume a recursive contemporaneous structure, i.e.
assume * to be triangular. Recent studies have devoted more careful attention to the
issue, imposing a variety of exclusion restrictions, either on the short-run or on the
long-run effects of a shock. Typical restrictions include requiring that monetary policy
shocks do not have immediate effects on some variables with high inertia, or that they
do not have long-run effects on variables which are thought to be ultimately
determined by supply-side factors.
Both short-run and long-run restrictions suffer from certain pitfalls. The short-run
restrictions are typically based less on theoretical considerations than on heuristic
arguments. Sometimes the heuristic arguments used are in manifest contradiction with
some theoretical results. For example, the popular assumption that monetary policy
does not have short-run (i.e. within-period) effects on output is at odds with the
neoclassical view that monetary policy RQO\ has short-run effects on output.
Often there is a better theoretical justification for relying on the long-run properties of
the model in the structural identification. When applied to the real world, many
theoretical arguments derived from models of a frictionless economy are best thought
as applying to the long-run equilibrium of the economy. However, even for the long
run it is often difficult to interpret the model implications as holding H[DFWO\. For
example, although the long-run growth of the economy is determined by the supply
side which probably is relatively unaffected by monetary policy, claiming that a
monetary episode causing a prolonged and significant slowdown of the economy
cannot have DQ\ effect on the supply side would be stretching the argument too far.
For this reason, it would appear fairly dubious to conclude that a particular shock
which is estimated to have had real effects in the long run (the actual length of which
is determined by the estimation period) cannot be of monetary origin. Hence, in our
view, the case for using exact restrictions on the long-run effects is not much stronger
than with the short-run restrictions.
Furthermore, as Faust and Leeper (1995) have shown, relying on long-run restrictions
to derive short and medium-run implications can be highly misleading. In a VAR
model, the relationship between long-run and short-run properties is a direct result of
the model’s autoregressive structure. However, this structure is meant to be a
reasonable approximation, not a faithful representation, of an arbitrary true data
generating process. A VAR with a reasonable lag length can be expected to track the
short-run properties of the true process well, but for long horizons, this is by no means
clear. In short, basing the identification scheme on long-run restrictions places an
unjustified emphasis on a particular property of the VAR framework which should be
viewed as a convenient simplification rather than as a true feature of the data
generating process.
                                                                                                                                           
the more general non-recursive setting, however, the space of possible identification schemes (possible
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All in all, there is no simple way to solve the identification problem. A variety of
approaches has been tried, producing, as showed in the previous section, rather
different outcomes. In this light, it is somewhat curious to see that in the literature, the
identifying assumptions used to define monetary policy are, in most cases, devoted
merely a single sentence, as the were technical assumptions with few consequences.
There is seldom any discussion about possible alternative identification schemes, or
about the sensitivity of the results with respect to the particular identification
restrictions (King and Watson, 1997, and Uhlig, 1997, are rare exceptions
16).
As a final methodological point, it is notable that the studies searching for cross-
country differences in monetary policy transmission invariably impose the same
identification scheme on all countries. In other words, any observed differences in the
responses are conditional on the assumption that the same qualitative restrictions
regarding the effects of monetary policy hold for each country. Given that the purpose
of the exercise is to identify differences in the monetary policy transmission,
conditioning the results on an identical set of assumptions seems rather
counterintuitive. In our view, a rigorous cross-country comparison should allow for
different identification schemes. In what follows, we propose an approach that allows
this.
 7KHLGHQWLILFDWLRQSUREOHPLQSUDFWLFH²DQH[DPSOH
The lack of exact knowledge regarding the correct contemporaneous structure does
not necessarily mean that no meaningful econometric conclusions are possible. If,
after applying some reasonable restrictions to exclude those identification schemes
that are clearly implausible, the remaining schemes produce closely similar
predictions, then the exact choice of identification scheme is largely irrelevant and
robust conclusions can be drawn.  But is this really the case in the bulk of
econometric work? In what follows, we try to show that this is not the case.
To illustrate the extent and consequences of the identification problem, and to shed
light on the methodology we use later in the cross-country comparison we have
estimated a 3-variable VAR model for the United Kingdom. The variables included
are the logarithmic levels of the real GDP and the consumer price index, and the level
of nominal 3-month money market interest rate. The data are quarterly, seasonally
non-adjusted, and span from the beginning of the 1970s to 1997 Q3. We estimated the
VAR in levels, which somewhat simplified the calculations later in the section.
We created an identified baseline model by using the Cholesky decomposition with
the ordering output - price level - interest rate.
17 This baseline structural model
determines a base of three orthogonal shocks, the third of which we, following the
                                                
16 King and Watson (1997) test the long-run neutrality of money in a two-variable VAR for a range of
identification schemes. Uhlig (1997) selects the identification scheme by maximising an ad hoc
objective function over a range of identification schemes.
17 Hence, our baseline model corresponds to a familiar recursive assumption that monetary policy
reacts to the contemporaneous values of all variables but does not have within-period effects on any of
them.16
usual tradition, label as our baseline monetary shock. To  this orthogonal base we
apply a series of orthogonal rotation matrices =L. Any three-dimensional rotation
matrix  =L can be represented as a function of three parameters $L,%L and &L:
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Loosely speaking, each of the three parameters determine the amount the matrix =
rotates the orthogonal base around a certain dimension. The last parameter &L, for
example, rotates the base around the third dimension, leaving the last structural shock
unchanged but "blending" together the effects of the first two shocks.  By varying the
WKUHHSDUDPHWHUVLQWKH UDQJH >  @ RQH FDQ SURGXFH DOO SRVVLEOH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
matrices.
As in the present context we are only interested in the effects of monetary policy on
output and prices, we do not have to examine all possible triplets of the parameters.
First, the parameter &L determines the extent to which the transformation matrix
rotates the base around the third axis, chosen to represent a genuine monetary policy
shock. This means that the parameter &L only affects the identification of the first two
shocks, but leaves the third one, the monetary policy shock, unaltered. Hence, when
searching for viable identification schemes for the monetary policy shock, we only
need to concentrate on the first two parameters $L and %L. Moreover, we can reduce
our search to those combinations of $L and %L in which both parameters take values
I U R P W K H U D Q J H >    @
18. Any parameter combination outside this range can be
remapped into it by a suitable transformation.
19
To map the whole space of identification schemes, we divided this range into a grid of
100*100, thus producing a set of 10000 schemes to evaluate. For the identification
scheme determined by each point in the grid, we generated the corresponding impulse
responses.
Next we needed a methodology that allows us to compare different identification
schemes on a sensible basis. In particular, the nature of a monetary shock can vary
considerably between identification schemes. A monetary shock can show up as a
very short-lived or as a sustained change in the interest rate. A sustained increase in
interest rates is likely to have larger effects elsewhere in the economy than a transitory
peak. However, such differences should be interpreted as reflecting differences in
estimated monetary policy reaction function rather than in the monetary policy
transmission. Whether this distinction is relevant or not depends on the intended use
of the model. If the purpose is to identify likely differences in the responses to the
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19 More precisely, any parameter combination ($,%) can be remapped into this range by choosing
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common monetary policy, then such differences due to monetary policy reaction
functions should be filtered out.
To account for such differences, we decided, instead of looking at the effects of
monetary policy shock of uneven size and duration, to examine the response of the
economy to a standardised monetary tightening.
20 That is, for every identification
scheme, we simulated a series of monetary policy shocks such that they produced a 1
percentage point increase in the short-term interest rate, sustained over a period of
four years. In this way we obtained a set of output and price responses which can be
compared in a meaningful way.
Obviously, not all identification schemes in our set of 10000 make good candidates
for monetary policy. In most cases, their predictions of the effects of monetary policy
are highly implausible. To provide an initial idea of how sharp the predictions get
when one begins to require intuitively "plausible" behaviour, we reduced the set of all
identification schemes criteria in several steps.
First, we filtered out those pairs of responses which failed to fulfil a minimal medium-
term "plausibility" criterion. We required that the accumulated response of the level
of both real output and the CPI in the UK to the sustained 1 percentage point
monetary tightening is, after two years, between zero and -10%. There were 1372
identification schemes which fulfilled this condition. Chart 1 illustrates the situation.
There are two distinct regions of parameter combinations  which fulfil this criterion:
one large area with 1299 observations, and a separate small slice with 73
observations. As we show below, the responses corresponding the two separate areas
differ qualitatively, so we differentiate the two areas by marking the larger one with
black markers and the smaller by grey markers.
Chart 2 plots the corresponding responses of output (horizontal axis) and prices
(vertical axis) after 2 years for these 1372 identification schemes. As in chart 1, the
two separate areas are again distinguished by grey markers for the larger block and
black markers for the small block. The chart shows that the identification schemes in
the larger block span the whole area of responses from zero to 10% both for output
and for prices. The smaller block of identification schemes covers likewise a sizeable
part of the upper right hand corner of the chart.
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Chart 2. Responses after 2 years
Chart 1. The "plausible" set19
The conclusion is that for any arbitrary combination of accumulated output and price
responses at the two-year horizon, an identification scheme can be found that provides
it. Of course, basing our selection criteria only at the two-year point leaves a lot open.
A closer inspection would reveal that a great majority of the 1372 sets of responses
are implausible in one way or another (there are many more ways to fail than to
succeed).  Charts 3a and 3b plot two response functions ¾ the first one from the
larger (grey) set (corresponding to parameter values of $L = 2.387 and %L = -.11) and
the second one from the smaller (black) set ($L = 2.01 and %L = 0.974) ¾ both of
which have the two-year accumulated responses close to 1% for both prices and
output. The first graph looks generally plausible, except for the somewhat
uncomfortably rapid onset of the price response. The responses in chart 3b, on the
other hand, exhibit clear explosive oscillating behaviour. This property is shared by
all identification schemes in the smaller (black) set, so in what follows, we will
exclude these schemes.
Since the first plausibility criterion proved to be exessively loose, we proceeded to
reduce the plausible set further. We did that by imposing additional restrictions in the
short and medium term. Specifically, we required that the (negative) within-quarter
impact of the monetary tightening must be smaller than 0.6% (in absolute value) both
on the price level and on output. We also required the accumulated responses of the
two variables to be negative after two and four years of tight money.
21
We found 240 identification schemes which fulfilled each of these conditions. The
full impulse response functions for these are presented in charts 4 and 5. Although the
two charts resemble the familiar "point-estimate-and-an-error-range" charts, the
correct interpretation is actually quite different. All the responses are observationally
equivalent ¾ the data support each response equally well. From a purely statistical
point of view, there is no presupposition that a response in the middle of the range is
                                                
21 These limits are chosen to facilitate the presentation of the methodological point ¾ they do not
intend to faithfully represent our priors. The cross-country comparison in the next section involves a
more careful handling of the plausibility conditions.
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more plausible than one near the edge. All such conclusions must be based on
considerations independent of the data.
An interesting observation is that the initial price responses are quite tightly packed at
around -0.4%. There is no identification scheme with the immediate price response
smaller than -0.2% which at the same time fulfils our medium-term restrictions. The
implication is that with our data set, attempting to identify monetary shocks by
restricting the within-quarter response of price level to zero (as in Ramaswami &
Sloek, 1998, Barran, HWDO 1997, and many others) would necessarily lead to response
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functions which fail our medium-term plausibility test. With regard to output
responses we see that the within-quarter responses are more widely spread and cover
the full range from zero to -0.6%. We consider this to be of plausible range of
magnitude, given that we are dealing with a sizeable tightening of a full percentage
point.
Equipped with this particular set of criteria, we would have to settle for a relatively
wide range of viable estimates. For example, it can be calculated that the negative
effect of a tightening at the beginning of the year on aggregate output of the UK
economy during the full year could be somewhere between less than 0.1% and more
than 0.6%. Similarly, in the third year of the tightening, the effect would be roughly
between 1% and 2%. Choosing a single ("best") identification scheme involves many
trade-offs and a careful weighting of one’s priors.
Finally, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that these are point estimates which ignore
the considerable degree of statistical uncertainty always involved with VAR impulse
responses. Hence, each estimate of the impulse response should be viewed as coming
with a (normally fairly wide) confidence interval attached.
We think that this example manages to show that although the "plausible"
identification schemes may only occupy a small part of the space of all possible
schemes, it is far from simple to pick out the single "most plausible" identification
scheme. Any plausible parametrisation is surrounded by a continuum of equally
plausible and observationally equivalent parametrisations. As one moves further away
from the original parametrisation, the parametrisation becomes less "plausible" and, at
some point, becomes "implausible". However, before reaching that point, the impulse
responses may have evolved considerably, leaving one not with a single estimate, but
with a range of impulse responses. In our opinion, a rigorous cross-country
comparison has to take this into account and base the comparison on the plausible
ranges instead of on single points in those ranges, selected by a mechanical criterion.
Such an approach will certainly yield less clear-cut results in terms of identifying
cross-country differences but would avoid the risk of spurious accuracy, which is
inherent in results based on single points within the ranges.
 'LIIHUHQFHVLQPRQHWDU\WUDQVPLVVLRQ ¾ DFURVVFRXQWU\
FRPSDULVRQ
 0HWKRGRORJ\
The previous two sections have sought to show that the present mainstream in the
analysis of monetary policy transmission using VARs suffers from serious
shortcomings. It is not obvious how these shortcomings could be overcome. Choosing
between a large number of observationally equivalent parametrisations is an
inherently fuzzy business which ultimately depends on the researchers’ subjective
priors. A high degree of subjective input leaves the econometrician exposed to
charges of manipulation of the results.22
We do not pretend to have a comprehensive solution to these problems. However, we
would like to suggest an approach which would fulfil some minimum standards of
objectivity and allow statistical inference. Having estimated VAR models for two
countries, it would seem natural to consider the evidence of differing monetary
transmission strong if, in the space of all possible identification schemes, there do not
exist two schemes, one for each country, such that i) they produce plausible response
functions for their respective countries and ii) the differences in the resulting
responses to standardised shocks can be reasonably explained by random variation.
This criterion may seem weak, and indeed, it is. Even if a vast majority of the viable
identification schemes in one country showed, say, a stronger response to monetary
shocks than those in the other country, as long as there is a single pair of schemes
which produce responses statistically similar enough, then the criterion would fail to
find a difference. However, it is difficult to think of any statistically justified test with
a higher power.
22
To apply this approach in practice, one has to first decide what criteria to apply when
judging the plausibility of the response functions. To minimise the amount of
arbitrariness involved, we suggest that two general principles should be adhered to.
First, the definition of plausibility should be the same for each country. Clearly, the
use of differing "plausibility windows" for different countries would bias the results.
Second, we think that it is important to use a window which reflects the true degree of
uncertainty in the priors, which usually means a fairly wide window DWHYHU\PDWXULW\.
In particular, we think that on the basis of our prior knowledge it would be
unjustifiable to restrict the impulse responses (or some function thereof) to pass
through a single point ¾ as would normally be the case if either the short-run or the
long-run effects were constrained to zero.
23
In this section we demonstrate the approach by applying it in the comparison of
monetary policy transmission in three countries: France, Germany, and the UK.
 'DWDDQGWKHPRGHOV
Our VAR models consist of three endogenous variables: real GDP, the CPI index, and
the three-month money market interest rate. For Germany, we included as an
exogenous variable the nominal world commodity price index, which was measured
in US dollars to guarantee a reasonable amount of true exogeneity.  Our quarterly data
come from the OECD and the IMF (IFS) databases, are seasonally non-adjusted, and
cover the period from the beginning of the 1970s to the third quarter of 1997.
                                                
22 In the spirit of Bayesian econometrics, one could envisage an approach in which each identification
scheme would be assigned a prior probability. In cross-country comparison, one would then take into
account both the parameter uncertainty and the (prior) probability distribution over the identification
schemes. We have not pursued this avenue.
23 Restricting the within-period effect of monetary policy on the price level and GDP to zero might be
justifiable with very high-frequency data. Given that the available data is usually quarterly we do not
think small within-period effects can be excluded.23
The output and price variables entered our VAR models in logarithmic differences,
interest rates in levels. Four lags were found to be sufficient for UK and France while
five lags was used for Germany. We did not search for co-integration, partly because
theory would not lead us to expect any long-run relationships, and partly because the
thrust of this paper is elsewhere.
An obvious complication in the cross-country comparison is that the estimation of a
separate model for each country would enable rigorous statistical evaluation of the
observed differences only in case the models were independent, i.e. if there is no
cross-model correlation of residuals. Given the interdependencies of the European
economies, this would likely be an incorrect assumption. Indeed, with our set of VAR
models, the residuals of the different systems turned out to be highly correlated, in
particular between the residuals of the GDP and interest rate equations. Hence, to
account for such dependencies and to enable cross-country comparison, we estimated
the three VAR models as a single system of seemingly unrelated equations.
24
Allowing cross-country interdependencies adds another dimension to the
identification problem. Instead of the structural decomposition of, in our case, three
3*3 residual covariance matrices one is faced with a single 9*9 covariance matrix
with many non-zero off-diagonal elements. One could imagine decomposing the
effects to, say, international monetary shocks, country-specific monetary shocks, etc.
We chose the simpler approach of concentrating on the familiar single-country
identification problem - i.e. for each country, we performed the structural
decomposition of the 3*3 covariance (sub-)matrix. The resulting "primary" shocks
were orthogonal within the same sub-system but not necessarily between different
systems. For example, the "primary monetary shocks" remained intercorrelated
between countries. We think that structural identification at the multi-country level
might be an interesting path for future work.
The estimation of the VARs as a system changed the point estimates of the parameters
only marginally, but the standard errors of the parameters narrowed notably. Also,
some effect was observed when simulating the confidence intervals for the cross-
country differences in the impulse responses. Due to the positive cross-country
correlation of the estimated impulse responses (mainly in the GDP responses between
France and Germany), some of the confidence intervals of the differences were
narrower than what would have been the case if the simulations had been based on
random simulations on independent models.
 (VWLPDWLRQUHVXOWV
Baseline model
To create a baseline model, we again applied the most commonly used identification
scheme, i.e. the triangular (Cholesky) decomposition with the interest rate variable
ordered as the last. In other words, we defined a monetary policy shock as an
                                                
24 As an exception, the analysis of the long -run properties of the models was done within the
framework of independent country-specific VARs.24
unanticipated change in interest rate with no within-period effect on prices or output.
The resulting responses of prices and output are plotted in chart 6. The upper row
presents the responses to a monetary shock of one standard deviation, the size and
duration of which varies from one country to another. The second row presents the
impulse responses to a standardised monetary tightening. The standardised monetary
tightening is defined as in the previous section; i.e. it consists of a series of monetary
shocks resulting in an interest rate increase of one percentage point which is sustained
at that level for the whole period of four years.
The estimated responses of real output to a monetary shock appear, at first sight,
rather plausible. They are reasonably well in line with the results obtained by
Ramaswami and Sloek (1998) using the same identification scheme. It appears that
the response of output to a monetary shock is the largest either in Germany or in the
UK, depending on the definition of the shock, while the response in France is the
smallest in both cases.
Unfortunately, a glance at the price responses reveals that this "plausible" outcome is
likely to be an illusion. For each of the three countries, we observe the "price puzzle",
i.e. the response of the price level to a monetary tightening is positive over the whole
simulation horizon, except for France, for which the effect tuns negative after two
years. To us, this is clear evidence of mis-identification of monetary policy shocks.
Our interpretation is that the model picks out as monetary policy shocks changes in
interest rates which were actually taken as a response to emerging inflationary
pressures. As a result, the estimated responses are not responses to monetary shocks,
but responses to some mixture of true monetary shocks and other shocks, for example,
supply shocks. Hence, a more careful structural identification seems required.
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Long-run properties
Notwithstanding the problems of using long-run (i.e. infinite horizon) restrictions to
identify VARs (see the discussion in section 3), the fact that they play an important
role in the literature warrants an examination of the long-run properties of our VAR
models.
Essentially, we would prefer that the models deemed plausible exhibit an approximate
long-run neutrality of money. It is not obvious in which form such a requirement
should be introduced. For various reasons, we do not believe that imposing
restrictions directly on the point estimates of the long-run effects is justified. First, as
discussed above, neither theoretical considerations nor the econometric structure are
robust enough to justify requiring exact long-run neutrality. Furthermore, examination
of the results shows that the long-run effects exhibit fairly serious instability, in the
sense that small perturbations in the identifying restrictions can cause large changes in
the estimated long-run effects.
Finally, there is the question of the precision with which the long-run effects are
estimated. Intuitively, the fact that over finite horizons, the standard errors of the
estimated impulse responses tend to increase drastically with the length of the
horizon, would suggest that for an infinite horizon the precision of the estimates
should be poor. This is not straightforward to verify rigorously since although the
point estimates of the long-run effects are easy to derive, their standard errors ¾ or
preferably their full probability distributions, which are not likely to be symmetric ¾
are not. King and Watson (1997) present a method for calculating approximate
standard errors in a 2-variable VAR, but that approach is not viable in our larger
model.
We developed a somewhat simpler approach to verify the consistency of different
identification schemes with long-run neutrality. Long-run neutrality implies a
particular, highly non-linear, condition on the VAR coefficients. By linearising this
condition, one can derive an asymptotic Wald-type test for the null hypothesis that the
long-run effect of a particular shock on output is zero. (See the Appendix for details.)
Hence, although we cannot calculate the confidence intervals for the long-run effects,
we can test whether the deviation from long-run neutrality is statistically significant
for each identification scheme.
Our findings for each country are summarised in Chart 7,  which condenses a
substantial amount of information on the long-run properties of the data. Basically,
the chart links the short-run properties of each identification scheme to the
corresponding long-run implications. In each panel of the graph, the horizontal axis
defines the impact (within-quarter) effect  of a 1 %-point monetary tightening on
output, and the vertical axis its impact effect on the price level. Together, these two
define a unique identification scheme.
For each identification scheme determined by its short-run effects, the left-hand
panels define the point-estimate of the long-run effect on output. The monetary
tightening is, once again, scaled to yield a one percentage point increase in the short
interest rate, sustained for four years. The thick grey line marks the singularity
frontier, on which the long-run effect switches from plus to minus infinity, i.e. is26
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undetermined.
25 The right-hand panels provide the marginal significance level of the
deviation of the estimate from zero, as given by the asymptotic Wald test.
For example, the traditional "no-within-period-effects" identification scheme would
be found at the origin of each panel. The upper left-hand panel shows that such
identifying assumptions would imply that in Germany, the monetary tightening would
have a negative long-term effect of nearly 4% on output. From the corresponding
right hand panel it can be read that this point estimate is significantly different from
zero at the 2% significance level. For France, the estimated long-term effect would be
about -6%, but just outside the 5% significance frontier. Finally, for the UK,  the point
estimate is just -2%, but nevertheless significantly (at 2% level) below zero.
In order to obtain a point estimate close to long-run neutrality, one would have to
accept ludicrously high impact effects. For Germany, if one retains zero impact effect
on output, the implied negative impact effect on price level would be approximately
15%. Conversely, maintaining a zero within-period effect on price level would have
to be counterbalanced by a more than 2% positive impact effect on output in order to
yield long-run monetary neutrality. For France and the UK, the numbers are
somewhat smaller, but nevertheless nonsensically high.
If long-run restrictions so manifestly fail to yield sensible results, why is it then that
many studies have seemingly successfully exploited them, producing intuitively
sensible outcomes? While it may be that better data and/or modelling techniques (e.g.
the inclusion of a larger number of variables) may have a role to play, we are inclined
to look for other explanations.
In many studies, the set of results reported is not complete, in the sense that only part
of the responses are shown. Typically strong restrictions on monetary policy effects
on one variable (output) get reflected in an unrealistic response of another (for
example, prices). Without a full set of results it is difficult to judge the overall
plausibility of the model.
It is also possible that the focus on non-standardised monetary shocks can mask
implausible outcomes. We suspect that particularly in high-dimensional models, the
model can create a shock with long-run monetary neutrality by finding an interest rate
path on which the high initial rates are counterbalanced by lower interest rates later,
so that there is no effect on the FXPXODWLYHinterest rate. In other words, each monetary
shock cancels its own initial effects. In our framework this is not possible, as the path
of the interest rate is fixed.
To summarise, it does not seem possible to formulate for the three countries a uniform
criterion for long-run effects of monetary policy while still allowing sensible
contemporaneous effects. Our interpretation is that the long-run estimates which our
VAR-models yield are simply too fragile to be helpful in identifying the structural
                                                
25 Intuitively, this happens when an identification scheme produces a zero FXPXODWLYHimpulse response
of interest rate; i.e. when initially higher interest rates are exactly matched by lower interest rates later.
In such a case the standardisation procedure, to get a comparable four-year tightening, creates an
infinite series of monetary shocks which do not converge to zero, thereby effectively multiplying the
long-run effect of the original, non-standardised shock by infinity.28
shocks. Hence, in what follows, we will only use short and medium-term plausibility
conditions.
Cross-country comparison
We proceeded to apply in practice the methodology outlined at the beginning of this
section by defining a window of plausible responses for prices and output at the short
and medium run. All plausibility criteria apply to the accumulated responses to a
standardised monetary tightening of one percentage point, as defined above. The
window was defined for three different horizons: within-period, 2 years, and 4 years.
To avoid ruling out differences by definition, we required a plausible candidate for
monetary shock to fulfil the following relatively loose criteria:
Within period After 2 years After 4 years
Output response Upper <0% <0% <-1.0%
Lower >-0.6% >-3.0% >-7.0%
Price response Upper <0.5% <0% <-1.0%
Lower >-0.6% >-3.0% >-7.0%
To identify the viable identification schemes, we searched the space of all
identification schemes by rotating the orthogonal base defining the three shocks in
VWHSVRI LHÛ2IWKHSRVVLEOHLGHQWLILFDWLRQVFKHPHVWKHQXPEHURI
schemes which fulfilled our plausibility criteria was 136 for Germany, 445 for France,
and 184 for the UK. The impulse responses corresponding to these schemes are
plotted in chart 8. In general, we observe that the plausible price responses of
Germany and the UK span roughly similar area while the responses for France are
more widely distributed. With regard to the responses of output, the responses are
similar for France and the UK, while for Germany, the viable responses are more
pronounced.
26
One feature shared by each country is that the immediate response of the price level is
always strictly, and mostly considerably, negative. We are somewhat uncomfortable
with the abruptness of the effects. Although we do not think that it is appropriate to
exclude the possibility of within-period effects of monetary policy on prices, our
subjective priors would have been better consistent with a more gradual onset of the
effect.
27
                                                
26 As can be observed by comparing chart 8 to charts 4 and 5, the impulse responses for UK have
changed somewhat. This is because the impulse responses in chart 7 are based on the coefficients from
system estimation in differences, while charts 4 and 5 come from OLS estimation in levels.
27 One explanation is that our three-variable model is too small to allow the identification of "pure
monetary shocks", in which case we would actually measure a mixture of responses to a number of
shocks. Perhaps our monetary shocks get mixed with policy responses to "financial shocks", i.e.
turbulence in the financial markets with direct effects on prices and output. Including a narrow29
Equipped with a rough knowledge about the plausible area for each country, we
proceeded to the statistical comparison of a set of three identification schemes. As
explained above, we wanted to pick three identification schemes as similar as
possible. As we found no computationally feasible formal method to identify the
statistically most similar triple, we used visual inspection to select three identification
schemes which were closely similar and, at the same time, corresponded as closely as
possible with our priors. The impulse responses corresponding to the selected
identification schemes are plotted in chart 9.
28  Each sub-plot includes the median
response together with the 5% and 95% bounds based on 1000 random draws from
the joint probability distribution of the SUR system.
                                                                                                                                           
monetary aggregate or the central bank’s foreign reserve position in the model might help to better
identification of monetary shocks.
28 We ended up with a triple selected from broadly the same part of the identification space. The
rotation matrices were Z(-0.63,-0.09,0) for Germany, Z(-0.48,-0.42,0) for France, and Z(-0.65, -0.22, 0)
for the UK. The resulting impulse responses are linear combinations of the baseline impulse responses
based on triangular (Cholesky) decomposition. For example, with the parameter combination chosen
for Germany, the impulse response of each variable to what is defined as a monetary shock is a
combination of its responses to the three baseline shocks (i.e. output, prices, and interest rate) with
weights (-0.09, -0.59, 0.80).
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The results are qualitatively in line with what is usually obtained with VARs. The
confidence intervals become, in some instances, quite wide for longer horizons. In
particular, the models seem to have little or no predictive content on the price
response in France beyond a horizon of a year or two. The output responses are
generally more tightly estimated than price responses, except for Germany, for which
both responses have a similar degree of uncertainty.
In relation to the degree of statistical uncertainty in the estimates, the cross-country
differences appear to be small. This is confirmed by chart 10 which plots the cross-
country differences in the responses, together with the 90% confidence intervals.
Taking into account the parameter interdependencies between the individual VAR
models (i.e. performing the random simulation at the system level) resulted in slightly
tighter confidence intervals for the differences than would have been the case with
random draws from independent distributions. Generally, zero is firmly within the
confidence intervals, except for very short horizons, for which some small, but just
marginally significant differences can be measured. However, the significance of
these differences is exaggerated by the fact that they are mainly determined by the
rotation matrices, which were kept unchanged across the simulations.
 In conclusion, our empirical analysis fails to produce evidence of the existence of
significant differences in monetary policy transmission among our sample of
countries. The sets of identification schemes which fit into our definition of plausible
differ somewhat in their general shape. However, a large enough overlap remains to
allow the possibility of statistically indistinguishable responses.
Obviously, there may be room for improvement in our VAR models. Our three-
variable model is quite possibly too narrow to allow the identification of the pure
monetary shocks. If the behaviour of our variables is driven by four or more other
shocks (with linearly independent effects), then the effects of pure monetary shocks
cannot be identified within our model.
29 The appropriate response would be to include
additional endogenous variables in the model. Unfortunately, the modelling approach
applied here gets increasingly difficult to apply in practice as the dimensionality of
the model increases.
A similarly potentially useful but computationally difficult extension of our approach
would involve a closer examination of implied monetary policy response functions. It
may be that a particular identification scheme, which produces plausible responses of
money and output to monetary policy, actually involves implausible responses of
monetary policy to the shocks driving the economy. By defining a "plausibility
window" also for monetary policy responses could therefore, in principle, further
policy shocks falls short of identifying unique responses to the other shocks. In order
to identify the latter, we need to choose also the third parameter &. In other words, for
each pair of responses of output and prices to monetary policy shocks, there is a
continuum of possible monetary policy response functions, arranged by the parameter
                                                
29 If the true process generating our three variables is  W W H / % ; ) ( = , where the shock vector  W H  is a N´
1 random vector, N > 3, then the process does not have an autoregressive representation in our three
variable framework and the responses to the primary shocks cannot be identified.32
&. If none of the monetary policy responses on the continuum is acceptable, then that
identification scheme can be rejected. Needless to say, verifying this for a large
number of identification schemes would be computationally very heavy.
 &RQFOXVLRQV
In recent years, a large number of econometric studies have sought to identify cross-
country differences in monetary policy transmission in the pre-EMU regime. Among
the most common methodologies in these studies has been the one of a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model. The results have generally varied a great deal and, as a
result, no consensus regarding the likely extent or nature of these differences has
arisen. In this paper we explore one particular source of differences in the results of
the VAR models, namely the structural identification of the econometric model.
Our results show that the choice of the structural identification scheme has a
substantial effect on the results. The set of plausible identification schemes is
typically still very large after taking into account theoretical (and ad hoc) information,
and consequently the resulting set of feasible impulse response functions exhibits
wide variation. In our view, this finding casts doubt on the studies that, based on the
comparison of results produced by a single identification scheme, claim to find cross-
country differences in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
We propose an alternative approach which explicitly recognises the degree of
uncertainty involved in choosing the identification scheme. Our approach consists of
defining a "plausibility window" for the impulse responses and accepting all impulse
responses that fall within this window as viable representations of the monetary policy
transmission. The analysis of cross-country differences in monetary transmission
would then be based on these plausible sets of impulse responses. We apply this
approach to the analysis of monetary policy transmission in three European countries,
namely France, Germany, and the UK. Our results show that it is possible to choose a
set of identification schemes such that the resulting impulse responses are broadly
plausible and, at the same time, do not differ to a statistically significant extent
between the three countries. Hence, the conclusion is that our data does not enable us
to confirm the existence of significant cross-country differences in monetary
transmission for those countries.
We do not claim to have shown that no cross-country differences exist in the
monetary transmission of the EU countries. On the contrary, in light of the existing
differences in financial market structures and price and wage mechanisms among the
EU countries, we consider it quite plausible that monetary transmission differs as
well. Rather, our point is that in order to prove the existence of such differences, a
much more careful handling of certain econometric issues is required. So far, the
existence of the differences has not been established. Given the complexity of the
issue and the extent of identification uncertainty, we have serious doubts about
whether macro-level econometrics will ever be able to resolve the issue.33
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The estimated VAR model can be written as in equation (1)
(A1) . ) ’ ( , )] ( [ S = = - W W W W X X ( X ; / $ ,
The purpose is to test whether identifying the model by a contemporaneous structure
given by the matrix =, where ==
   S, is consistent with zero long-run effect of
monetary shock on output. We write the model:
(A2) . ) ’ ( , )] ( [ , H H ( =H ; / $ , W W W W = = -
The long-run effects of the shock vector  W H are given by the matrix  . )] 1 ( [
1
W / = $ , º -
-
The long-run matrix / is highly non-linear in the original parameters and hence the
distribution of its elements cannot be directly solved. However, denoting the inverse
of / by  )] 1 ( [
1 $ , = . - º
- , it is easy to verify that that the upper right-hand element
13 O of the matrix /, giving ¾ with our ordering ¾the long-run effect of a monetary
shock on output, is of the form
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where  LM N denote the elements of ., and ; is a finite-valued nonlinear function of the
elements of .. Hence, testing the long-run neutrality of money boils down to testing
the null hypothesis:
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where  ) (. YHF = N . Linearising around the OLS estimate of N yields
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To derive a test for this restriction, notice first that $(1) is a simple summation matrix
of the original parameters, so its probability distribution is asymptotically normal and
easy to calculate. Using the vector notation, we write the distribution of $(1) as
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where the tilde denotes the OLS estimate and  / W
~  is the appropriate parameter
covariance matrix. The distribution of N
~  can be derived as follows:
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Using this, the asymptotic distribution of the constraint is
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which is asymptotically  ) 1 (
2 c  distributed under the null.